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I51dmarc UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 DOMINGO CASTILLO MARCELINO, et al., 4 Plaintiffs, New York, N.Y. 5 16 Civ. 6287(KPF) V. 6 374 FOOD INC., et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 May 1, 2018 10 3:28 p.m. Before: 11 12 HON. KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, 13 District Judge 14 APPEARANCES 15 MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 16 BY: SHAWN RAYMOND CLARK COLIN JAMES MULHOLLAND 17 LEHMAN LG LLC 18 Attorneys for Defendants BY: BRIAN EARL LEHMAN 19 JULIE ROSENBLUM SOLARZ 20 21 22 23 24 25

THE CLERK: In the matter of Marcelino versus 374 1 Counsel, please identify yourselves for the record. 2 Food. 3 MR. CLARK: Shawn Clark, of Michael Faillace & Associates, for plaintiff. Good afternoon, your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: Sir, good afternoon. 6 MR. MULHOLLAND: Colin Mulholland, with Michael 7 Faillace & Associates. Good afternoon. THE COURT: Good afternoon as well. Thank you. 8 9 MR. LEHMAN: Brian Lehman of Lehman LG LLC. 10 THE COURT: Yes. Thank vou. 11 MS. SOLARZ: Julie Solarz, Lehman Law Group, for 374 12 Food Inc., et al. 13 Thank you so much. THE COURT: 14 Mr. Clark, should I be directing questions to you or to Mr. Mulholland? 15 MR. CLARK: I can principally answer your questions, 16 17 your Honor, but Mr. Mulholland may have additional information. THE COURT: That is fine. Sir, there seem to be two 18 issues raised in Mr. Lehman's correspondence with me, and one 19 20 is the issue of disqualification and the other is the issue of the need, or not, for an evidentiary record. I do understand 21 22 that you disagree on both parts, but I just want to explore the 23 issues with you a little bit. And, look, I also understand, 24 just by way of background, you will either agree or disagree

with my decision but it is a decision I am not moving from.

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Given the findings I have made, the question is what do we do now.

So, Mr. Clark, what is your view with respect to the issue of disqualification, unless you are just going to rely on your papers?

MR. CLARK: Your Honor, we oppose. We believe that any potential sanctions are speculative, especially in light of the submission yesterday, which pointed out that defense counsel believes that on the record as it stands there is insufficient evidence for a sanctions finding against counsel. Given that disqualification is itself based on the idea that there could potentially at some point be a --

THE COURT: I will ask you just to slow down, please. Thank you so much.

MR. CLARK: I apologize, your Honor.

THE COURT: No problem, sir.

MR. CLARK: Given that the disqualification motion is itself based on the idea that I believe essentially that any sanction against — any sanctions motion which affects both the client and counsel could potentially create a conflict, I believe that the concession that the record as it stands does not support sanctions really eliminates the underlying basis, such as it is, for a disqualification motion.

In addition --

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. CLARK: In addition, the plaintiff in this case has been advised of your Honor's opinion and any potential consequences of that opinion, and he still wishes to continue with us as counsel of record. Given that, and the case law concerning disqualification in the Second Circuit, we believe disqualification isn't appropriate, and at the very least it is an issue that should be briefed given the considerable legal issues underlying the case.

THE COURT: OK. Let me just probe that with you a little bit, sir.

The way I see my finding, I made a finding that Mr. Castillo Marcelino perjured himself, and to my mind he either did it on his own or he did it with your -- I hate to think with your knowledge or with your instigation, and I am worried about figuring out what happened. You'll excuse me for using the criminal analogue, but in a criminal case sometimes when there is a question about disqualification, there is a hearing where a second attorney is appointed in order to explore conflict issues with the client. This is -- we just call it a <u>Curcio</u> hearing. And I'm just wondering if I were able to obtain through the *pro se* office, because it's my expectation that Mr. Castillo Marcelino is without funds at this time to hire another attorney, if I were able to secure someone to speak with him and just sort of give him a second opinion, would there be anything objectionable to that, sir?

MR. CLARK: I believe so, your Honor, given that he did choose us as his counsel of record. Disqualification is a severe sanction --

THE COURT: Sir, I want to be clear on what I'm saying. I'm not saying to disqualify you. I'm saying to make sure that he just has a second opinion on the various issues raised by the disqualification motion.

MR. CLARK: Your Honor, if I would be able to return to you with an answer on that? My feeling — my instinct is that given the speculative nature of the sanctions at this time, I don't think that there is anything really close at this time concerning potential sanctions which I think is concrete enough to create even a potential conflict.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. CLARK: Now, certainly if -- which moves me to my second point, that I do think that there needs to be briefing by Mr. Lehman concerning the questions asked by your Honor before we can meaningfully proceed.

THE COURT: Just him? I presume you as well?

MR. CLARK: Oh, yes, of course, in response to his briefing.

Part of the issue is is that insofar as was raised by defendants' letter in the case --

THE COURT: Which? The disqualification letter, sir, or the evidentiary letter?

MR. CLARK: The evidentiary letter.

THE COURT: Yesterday's letter.

MR. CLARK: It is relatively unclear what, you know, the nature of the sanctions the defendants wish to explore are. Certainly he has I think correctly noted that he cannot seek Rule 11 sanctions at this time. They would need to be sua sponte sanctions. He also explored that he doesn't believe that unless Second Circuit law changes and/or additional evidence arises, that he can actually seek sanctions under the other section — another statutory provision.

Now, and the additional issue in the case --

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. CLARK: -- as I understand it --

THE COURT: -- yes, sir.

MR. CLARK: Is in addition to the fact that it's still unclear to me precisely the contours of the potential sanctions that defendants are seeking, there is case law, to our understanding, which I think your Honor should potentially review concerning your finding of this client engaging in perjury. The case in particular that we found is a case called Penthouse International, Limited v. Dominion Federal Savings and Loan Association, 855 F.2d 963. And in that particular case it had, I think, very similar facts to this one, where a district judge made a finding of perjury after reviewing all of the evidence. And the Second Circuit's reaction to this was —

and if I may quote it?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. CLARK: "with regard to the perjury finding, we are somewhat surprised by its presence in the Court's decision. If the Court viewed Gorlich's testimony as incredible, that is its prerogative as the trier of fact in a nonjury case. But unless perjury is at issue in a case, such a finding is not necessary once the trier of fact finds the witness' testimony incredible. The perjury finding here, however, was not only unnecessary but also was erroneous since it was not based on clear and convincing proof."

Now, I think that raises two issues which I think that the Court should address in one way or another.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm.

MR. CLARK: First is the issue of whether the Court could appropriately move on to this question, given it wasn't a necessary element of any claim. And then the second question is whether or not the Court identified and employed the clear and convincing evidence standard for --

THE COURT: I cited <u>Dunnigan</u> in my decision so I did note the standard.

Your first argument is a stronger one, which is that perhaps what I should have done is simply disregard his testimony or credit it as far as I do and leave it at that, without worrying about sanctions. But in terms of not using

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the right standard, oh, no, I knew -- I knew -- the standard that I was using.

MR. CLARK: In which case I do think that there is an additional issue that we would at least like to brief the Court --

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. CLARK: -- concerning that, which I don't believe we had the opportunity to as of yet.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. CLARK: And because of that, in combination with the --

THE COURT: Might I know what that other issue is, sir, please?

MR. CLARK: Excuse me?

THE COURT: Might I know what your other issue is?

MR. CLARK: The issue beyond --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CLARK: In terms of the disqualification issue, that I believe any potential sanctions are merely potential at this time.

THE COURT: OK. I might have misunderstood the very last thing that you were saying and that's because I interrupted you. It is my recollection, from writing the opinion, that I did include <u>Dunnigan</u> — the cite to <u>Dunnigan</u>, which is the criminal case, and I do believe I was using clear

and convincing. I thought I heard you say that that raises another issue. Are you saying with respect to the disqualification motion or something else, sir?

MR. CLARK: It raises the issue that -- and certainly I think that this comes up in the context of whether or not sanctions are appropriate as to the plaintiff --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CLARK: -- particularly, that whether or not there was sufficient evidence to meet that standard based on the facts of the case. Certainly given, you know, your Honor's opinion and your statement now that you did recognize that as the standard, we certainly will understand and respect that. At the same time, I don't believe that there is any post-trial briefing concerning this issue, and we do think it is germane to the question of whether or not sanctions are appropriate against the plaintiff and, accordingly, would be something that we would address.

THE COURT: So there are two issues. The first is disqualification, which we have been talking about, and that sort of dovetails into the second, which is the need for an evidentiary hearing.

Is it your position, sir, that -- I mean, would you agree with me, and with Mr. Lehman, that right now Mr. Lehman is operating a little bit in the dark because he is not privy -- and I'm not saying he ever will be privy -- to the

communications that you had with your client preliminary to taking the lawsuit and proceeding to trial?

MR. CLARK: Well, certainly I think that we're in the dark, too, to the extent that it's not clear what the theory or nature of the alleged sanctions are. Without some briefing by him clarifying at least the nature of the sanctions --

THE COURT: OK.

MR. CLARK: -- I don't know how we can reasonably respond or how a hearing is going to effectively address the issues before the Court.

THE COURT: All right. I think you and I are talking past each other. Let me say that again.

Your point to me is that you're operating with a deficiency of — without knowledge of the precise legal issues that are being raised by Mr. Lehman but actually that came initially from me. And what I'm trying to figure out is having found that there was such severe perjury at this trial, what am I to do? You may say to me, based on the Penthouse

International decision that you just quoted from, that I am limited, I am limited to a finding against him. This is the lies were to me in my capacity as trier of fact and not as judge and I can discredit them, but I can't say that they amount to something warranting additional sanctions. That's what I understood you to be saying with that citation; yes, sir?

MR. CLARK: That is a potential argument, your Honor.

THE COURT: That is a potential argument. And so to say you don't know what sanctions Mr. Lehman is seeking is understandable, but I guess that's also what I'm trying to figure out. I'm trying to figure out the rights that I have. It does appear that I have Rule 11 rights. I always have, to a degree, my inherent powers. There is — is it 1297 or 1927? I always get them confused.

MR. CLARK: Yes, 1927.

THE COURT: 1927, that's specific to the attorneys, correct?

MR. CLARK: Mm-hmm.

THE COURT: And so from my perspective, whatever I have in play is in play. I believe what Mr. Lehman was saying -- and eventually I will let him speak -- is that in addition to whatever he would want to tell me about how this affected the defendants, one of the specific things he wants to tell me is that the lies told by Mr. Castillo Marcelino regarding Tiran Tsadok were particularly deleterious because he had never met him, he had to come up from Florida for this, there was no reason for him to identify him falsely as the individual with whom he had regular communications at Tribeca Vehicles. So that's what I was understanding.

So I hear your -- your point, sir, is you need to know what the playing field is before you can respond to some of the

questions. I'm just not sure that is the case. I'm trying to understand -- from my perspective, all sanction avenues are open until you tell me they are closed.

Is what you're saying, sir, is that it would be your preference to first decide on a set of sanctions and then decide what evidentiary information would be appropriate for me to decide that issue? Because right now are we in agreement, sir -- well, I'll ask Mr. Lehman. Rule 11 doesn't seem to be in play, correct?

MR. CLARK: I would agree that Rule 11 doesn't seem to be in play.

THE COURT: Mr. Lehman, do you think it is?

MR. LEHMAN: It is in play for you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I still have it, OK. Fair enough.

MR. LEHMAN: Just to clarify, do you mean in play for the plaintiff's counsel or for the plaintiff?

THE COURT: As to both.

MR. LEHMAN: So certainly for plaintiff's counsel and for that one narrow provision of Rule 11, if the plaintiff caused the violation by the plaintiff's counsel, then he can be sanctioned.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. LEHMAN: Generally Rule 11 only speaks to attorneys, but if I advocate evidence and give it to my attorney and he gives it to the court, the court doesn't

1 sanction the plaintiff's counsel, they sanction plaintiff.

THE COURT: Understood. OK.

So, Mr. Clark, it seems like from Mr. Lehman's perspective all avenues are open.

MR. CLARK: Well --

THE COURT: Would you like first to respond to more robust briefing on sanctions and then on the hearing, or not, that is necessary?

MR. CLARK: Really --

THE COURT: Mr. Mulholland. Yes.

MR. MULHOLLAND: I think the main concern the plaintiff has right now is that there has been an order by the Court and there has been two submissions by Mr. Lehman.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MULHOLLAND: The plaintiff would like an opportunity to brief and respond to all of those allegations in writing, complete with case law, prior to any decision being made on either the disqualification or the evidentiary hearing.

THE COURT: Well, then to my earlier question, are you asking that I accept Mr. Lehman's invitation that this be a letter in furtherance — a premotion letter and that there be a more detailed motion from him regarding sanctions and/or the need for an evidentiary hearing, to which you may respond with more detail and more case law?

MR. CLARK: If my understanding is that if this is

interpreted as a premotion letter and this is simply added to the other arguments already expected by your Honor in defendants' briefing, I would agree with that. I think that you can deal more fully with the issue after it is briefed in tandem with the other issues.

THE COURT: One moment.

Off the record.

(Pause)

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Counsel, my point is this. It is not often -- indeed, it's hardly ever that I make the findings that I make in the opinion that I made. I don't go inviting sanctions applications. This is very serious to me. I want everyone's best ideas as to what I can do and what I should do.

So, from your perspective, sir, how can I get the very best information about what I can and what I should do?

MR. CLARK: I do believe that briefing is appropriate.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. CLARK: And then based on that briefing, which can include more clear articulation of the need, or lack thereof, of a hearing, and then based on that written briefing determine whether a hearing is necessary.

THE COURT: Simultaneous or responsive?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  CLARK: I would say responsive with really the same framework that your Honor crafted in the opinion. I'm

certainly happy to give defense counsel an extension of time, as he requested in his letter. And as long as I think that we get like 30 days to respond from the date of defense counsel's submission, I think we would be open to that.

THE COURT: OK. Mr. Lehman, let me please hear from you, sir. Thank you for your patience.

MR. LEHMAN: With regard to the plaintiff, it is not speculative that he will be sanctioned of some sort.

THE COURT: It is my expectation but we'll see. They may persuade me through this <u>Penthouse</u> case --

MR. LEHMAN: Right.

THE COURT: -- that I am limited or I should limit myself simply to not accepting his testimony. I'm not -- we'll see.

MR. LEHMAN: So if one were to assume for the sake of argument that that's going to happen, or it has some percentage chance, then the only question after that is how much. One dollar? A thousand? 10,000? 50,000. It could get high. There is some case law out there that has people compensate the court for its time, and given the average district court is about like 1.1 million a year for the security in the building, the numbers I've seen are somewhere between 300 and a thousand dollars an hour. So multiplied by the hours, it could get significant for the plaintiff.

That part is not speculative. Regarding the briefing

on plaintiff's counsel, I don't know that I can give briefing for what I think should happen.

THE COURT: I'll ask the question differently.

MR. LEHMAN: Sure.

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THE COURT: To the extent I construe your submissions -- which really did provoke some thought, so I do thank you for them -- as premotion submissions, do you have more to give me? If the answer is no, if the answer is this is everything you've got --

MR. LEHMAN: On disqualification, yes.

THE COURT: On sanctions?

MR. LEHMAN: Oh, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: On both. I'll take both.

MR. LEHMAN: So on disqualification, yes, I have more to give you. I could fully brief that.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. LEHMAN: One issue that I only saw yesterday afternoon and started researching today was under Rule 3.3 of the New York Code of Professional Conduct, which is modeled after the ADA -- and, again, I only saw this yesterday when doing the letter for you.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. LEHMAN: The lawyers are required to remedy false statements to the Court.

In addition, under Rule 1.6, attorney-client privilege

doesn't apply at that point. So after a trial, if they knowingly -- it says, Rule 3.3(a): "If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal."

And there are other provisions that I would brief on.

THE COURT: Yes. Although Mr. Clark and
Mr. Mulholland may take the view that even though I decided as
I decided, I'm wrong and there is no information to correct.
But that's for another day.

Do you believe that you could write a longer brief that discusses both the disqualification and the sanctions points without an evidentiary hearing but perhaps identifying things that would be useful to you?

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$  LEHMAN: I do believe that I can do it for disqualification.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. LEHMAN: And I do believe that I could do it for sanctions for the plaintiff with the caveat that he may not be responsible for everything here.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. LEHMAN: So I would just be assuming that he is a hundred percent responsible for everything.

On the third, I could not give additional briefing on

what should be done with plaintiff's counsel, if anything.

THE COURT: Understood. Is there more that you can tell me about the information you believe that I should be looking at in deciding what to do with respect to plaintiff's counsel? And if not, that's fine.

MR. LEHMAN: I thought the idea of a second attorney was a good one. It's one that I would -- if a second attorney came and said, yeah, I talked to him independently, told him what's going on, and he said I'm good with this --

THE COURT: If that were the case, would you then withdraw your disqualification?

MR. LEHMAN: I believe I would. I believe 90 percent chance I would. I would want to look at 3.3 a little bit more, but a strong presumption is if a lawyer independently talks with this gentleman and says this is what's going on and he says these are my attorneys, I'm much more comfortable with it.

THE COURT: OK. It sounds like from that answer, though, that I should refrain from setting a briefing schedule on anything further until I hear from Mr. Clark and Mr. Mulholland as to their views with respect to the appointment of a second counsel.

MR. LEHMAN: I would agree.

THE COURT: Mr. Clark.

MR. CLARK: Just to clarify --

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. CLARK: -- because I feel like we are talking about a few different issues.

THE COURT: We absolutely are, yes.

MR. CLARK: My understanding from your Honor's position was that there would be someone from the *pro se* office who would talk to the plaintiff concerning the issues.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CLARK: And not necessarily that they were second counsel or co-counsel.

THE COURT: That is in fact what I was thinking, sir.

Let me say that again. I would ask Ms. Malloy, at the pro se office, to find an attorney to represent Mr. Castillo Marcelino on a limited purpose basis, to show — to just talk to him about my decision and what issues might arise from that and whether or not he wishes to continue with you as his counsel in light of my decision. And were I new counsel, I'd like at my decision and I'd look at the letters preliminary to this conference and I'd advise him accordingly.

And if Mr. Castillo Marcelino wanted to stay with you as counsel, then great. If he wished to do something else, then we'll deal with that. But I believe what Mr. Lehman is saying is he has a longer disqualification motion to write but it's not worth writing if, with the assistance of a second attorney, or having consulted with a second attorney, Mr. Castillo Marcelino stays with your firm.

MR. CLARK: OK. I just wanted to make sure that that is confirmed, because I heard something along the lines of there is a 90 percent chance that if this process is followed that there will be no disqualification motion.

THE COURT: Yes. What he said was that he wanted to look at Rule 3.3 and see if that impacted the matter.

MR. CLARK: I would like to hear from Mr. Lehman what his views are, because if we are going to end up doing a disqualification motion no matter what, I think that we could move forward with the disqualification motion. Certainly at this point I don't believe that there is a strong background to it. However, given, you know, this process that your Honor suggested, I would very seriously consider using it if it was a way to avoid longer motion practice. If, however, it's merely a dress rehearsal for longer motion practice, I'm much less likely to consider it seriously.

THE COURT: OK. By which you mean dress rehearsal on the issue of disqualification. It obviously doesn't obviate or even pertain to the sanctions issue.

MR. CLARK: They are distinct issues.

THE COURT: Indeed.

Would each of you like some period of time to go home, think about it, and tell me, you, sir, whether you are inclined to do it conditionally, Mr. Clark, and you, Mr. Lehman, whether a review with a second attorney that resulted in Mr. Castillo

Marcelino sticking with counsel, with Mr. Clark and Mr. Mulholland, would obviate the need for a disqualification motion?

Shall I say that again?

MR. LEHMAN: Sure.

THE COURT: OK. The question on the floor is whether anyone is aided by having a second attorney that has nothing — no horse in the race speak with Mr. Castillo Marcelino and discuss with him, I believe, my opinion and the letters preliminary to this conference and anything else they wish to talk about. If after discussions with that attorney, Mr. Castillo Marcelino wishes, for example, to stay with that attorney for the remainder of this case, or to get new counsel, then the disqualification motion is obviated because he's electing to go with someone else.

Agreed, Mr. Clark?

MR. CLARK: Yes. I believe that that was correct. I missed a little bit at the end. My apologies. I was having a side conversation.

THE COURT: I saw that. Let me say it slower again.

MR. CLARK: My apologies.

THE COURT: If after consultation with this second attorney Mr. Castillo Marcelino elects to go with that attorney or someone else, we no longer need a disqualification motion because he will leave you, he will get a new attorney. Agreed?

MR. CLARK: Well, yes. That would be functionally that we were disqualified.

THE COURT: However -- OK. The issue is the next part of the other fork in the road, which is if, after meeting with this attorney and having what I believe to be an appropriate discussion with that attorney, he elects to stay, to keep you as his counsel, I'm asking Mr. Lehman if there is a basis for a disqualification motion. What Mr. Clark is saying is it's hardly worth the effort of the consult with the second attorney if we're just going to have to have this motion anyway. I might disagree with that but I'm asking for your thoughts, sir.

MR. LEHMAN: I will withdraw my motion or my premotion letter to disqualify Mr. Clark and Mr. Mulholland and their law firm if an independent lawyer talks with the plaintiff about all the legal issues that could arise and the plaintiff decides to stay with that law firm, I will withdraw my motion to disqualify. That does -- and I will withdraw -- I withdraw it.

Second, perhaps not, moving forward, if new facts arise that I can't even imagine, then I might do it. I also say, this is not -- I don't have too much of a dog in this particular fight.

THE COURT: Yes. You're trying to stave off a Second Circuit reversal.

MR. LEHMAN: And, frankly, some courtesy towards a person who might not be as advantaged as I have and it is now

1 getting serious. And I intend to treat it seriously, but I'm fine; if he wants to stay with him after talking to him, so be 2 3 it. 4 THE COURT: OK. Mr. Clark. 5 MR. CLARK: As I stated earlier, I would want a short 6 period of time. I can get back to the Court within 48 hours, 7 if that is OK? 8 THE COURT: Yes. 9 MR. CLARK: To talk to the client and ensure that he 10 is also open to going through that procedure. 11 THE COURT: I assume that you will be dispassionate in 12 your discussion of that procedure --13 MR. CLARK: Certainly, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: -- with your client? 15 If you agree to that procedure, may I understand that I may speak with Ms. Malloy about the parameters of what this 16 17 new counsel is being asked to do? 18 MR. CLARK: And that is the Pro Se Clerk, correct? 19 THE COURT: Indeed. 20 I don't have any objection to that, your MR. CLARK: 21 Honor. 22 THE COURT: OK. Mr. Lehman, no objection to my 23 speaking --24 MR. LEHMAN: No objections, your Honor.

THE COURT:

I don't think that I would be speaking to

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the attorney him or herself, I think I would be just channeling things through the *pro se* office. I don't think it is appropriate for me to speak to the attorney. That is the current contemplation.

MR. CLARK: Understood.

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THE COURT: OK. Then let's do that. I don't want to delay this. Neither do you. You want resolution. So do I. But I care more that everyone is treated fairly.

I will work with the *pro se* office to see if someone can be secured. As I'm doing that, you will tell me your views on it. If it turns out that you disagree, then I'll set a briefing schedule for the disqualification motion. And I think we'll just do that one first, and that will inform the size of any other motion.

It's unfortunate that we can't get things done more quickly but this is -- again, we're trying to be fair and correct here, so let's do that.

Mr. Clark, with that in mind, is there anything else we should be addressing today, sir?

MR. CLARK: Certainly in terms — my understanding at this point is we're addressing the disqualification issues first.

THE COURT: Exactly right, sir.

MR. CLARK: We have not set a timetable as to submissions concerning the Court's questions?

THE COURT: We have not because I can't tell you how quickly I can get someone who would wish to represent

Mr. Castillo on so unique a limited purpose representation, and you still haven't told me that you agree to it.

MR. CLARK: Understood.

THE COURT: Mr. Mulholland.

MR. MULHOLLAND: At this point we have to talk to Marcelino.

THE COURT: I understand that, sir.

MR. MULHOLLAND: I wonder, as an alternative, if we could brief Marcelino as to whether he could come to court for a brief limited purpose hearing for the Court to the give him advisos --

THE COURT: A civil <u>Curcio</u> hearing?

MR. MULHOLLAND: Yes. I don't know if that is an option.

THE COURT: I don't know that that is an option. I don't know. I would be concerned that I would be perceived as giving him legal advice, which is not something I want to do. I also don't want you to later on say that the judge who is considering sanctions is the one who is talking to him about what he should do. I haven't thought that through yet, sir, so I will think that through. I will let you think it through as well.

MR. MULHOLLAND: Yes. Thank you.

I51dmarc THE COURT: Thank you. OK. Mr. Lehman, anything else today, sir? MR. LEHMAN: Nothing, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you all very much for coming in. Thank you for your patience. I will hear from you as soon as I can hear from you. MR. CLARK: Thank you, your Honor. THE CLERK: All rise, please. (Adjourned)